1. Deductive and Inductive Inference. Within the traditional treatments of scientific method, e.g., in and, it was customary to divide scientific inference into two parts: deductive and inductive. Deductive inference was taken to mean the activity of deducing theorems from postulates and definitions, whereas inductive inference represented the activity of constructing a general statement from a set of particular “facts.” Deductive inference was relegated to the mathematical sciences, and inductive inference to the empirical sciences. As a consequence, the whole of (...) science was split into two quite distinct parts: deductive science was conceived to start with precise axioms, postulates, and definitions, and its method consisted in drawing inferences from these “givens” in such a way that if the original assumptions are taken as true, then the theorems must be taken as true also. The obligation behind this “must” of the mathematical sciences was an obligation based on strict rules of deductive inference; in the earlier analyses, it was supposed that these rules were all aspects of the general theory of the syllogism, as it was described in an almost complete form in but in later work the rules have been formalized in more general terms. Inductive inference, on the other hand, was supposed to start with observed facts; these facts, or “data,” were presumably given by the senses, and described particular aspects of the external world. If the facts were given in a certain way, then the empirical scientist could “infer” a generalized description; this generalization had the characteristic that if it were granted as true, then all the facts could be deduced as consequences. The inductive process admittedly does not lead to unique generalizations, and the philosopher of science searched for other defining characteristics of good inference, such as “simplicity” and “convenience.” These empirical generalizations were taken to be “descriptions of the phenomenal world of the scientist”; a further inductive step might be taken by constructing a set of very general principles out of the more specialized generalizations within specific research problems. These “higher” inductive inferences were regarded as “theories,” which could be studied by themselves within the method of deductive inference. The scientist was then described as “checking” theory by determining whether or not the predicted consequences deduced from theory actually hold in the phenomenal world. (shrink)

The problem. The model. Inventory models. Allocation models. Waiting-time models. Replacement models. Competitive models. Testing, control and implementation. Administration of operations research. Index.

The boundaries of psychology have never been very distinctly defined and, as a consequence, science has witnessed frequent border incidents. But it obviously is not psychology alone which suffers from such lack of delineation, but its neighbors, the biological and social sciences, do as well. Cooperation between sciences becomes difficult under these conditions. All agree that psychology is the science of mind, but few agree to what “mind” is. At least within our century “mind” has been taken to be “behavior”, (...) for the present day outlook is that mind is behavior rather than that which is responsible for behavior. The metaphysical dynamism of a prime mover has been replaced by an experimental concept, i.e., one that is susceptible to scientific investigation. There is no need to review the complex history of behavioristic psychology in its many ramifications, ranging from Watson's mechanism to the various vitalistic teleologies. We turn instead to a fundamental problem on which there is little agreement: “What kind of behavior should be called mind?”. (shrink)

“Unification of Science” is probably the most popular slogan in contemporary philosophy. This phrase has not only become the cry of a specific group of philosophers, but it is now accepted as one of the aims of philosophy by most of the contemporary philosophic schools, with but few exceptions. Each particular school believes that it has found the way of effecting such a unification, implicitly assuming that it knows the conditions for a unified science. One who concerns himself with the (...) literature of the movements soon becomes aware of current confusion in the meaning of the expression, “Unification of Science“. The observer begins to wonder whether “Unity of Science” has not become a philosophic stereotype, designed to evoke feeling rather than thought. (shrink)

2. In the first place, the term "power" is used to refer to processes which are held to go on at particular times, and to be accessible to direct experience. It is not clear to me why our experiences of activity are not "explicit", or why they are not to be regarded as manifested to the senses ; but possibly these assertions could be defended on the ground that the experiences in question are phenomenologically distinctive in some way.

1. Outline of the Project. This paper is intended to be a progress report on a project in philosophy of science. The immediate stimulus of this report is the eightieth birthday of E. A. Singer, Jr., who was the inspiration of the project, and, needless to say, though responsible for the whole is not responsible for the misconceptions in the specific parts.

In recent issues of the Journal of Philosophy John Dewey and Arthur Bentley have been making an attack on certain logical positivists and other logicians on the ground, of all things, that they display amazing contempt for clear and consistent definition of the terms they use. That logicians, whose business it is to define consistency, should themselves be inconsistent in the use of their basic terms is not really so surprising. It may merely prove them to be human, the victims (...) of a simple failure to practice what they preach. If this were the case, the situation would not be so bad, for who better than a drunkard knows the evils of drink? And yet it is equally human to require preacher to be practitioner as well. So that the spankings which Bentley and Dewey are currently administering to Carnap, Cohen, Nagel, Ducasse, Lewis and Morris are quite in order. In fact in the case of the logical positivists they are long overdue. Carnap, particularly, has long outraged patience as well as common sense with rambling verbal analysis of the meaning of terms used in the exposition of logical positivism. (shrink)

Mr. Wisdom, as a philosopher, wants to tell philosophers that they should not use an inductive schema to talk about science. Mr. Bridgman wants to tell scientists they should be more cautious in the use of concepts. Mr. Hempel wants to tell scientists, and I presume social scientists especially, that defining is a tricky matter and should not be indulged in lightly. And finally, Mr. Brain wants to tell philosophers how to talk a bit more sensibly about brains, sense data (...) and minds. Thus every combination of teacher and pupil in the philosopher-scientist domain seems to have been covered in these four efforts. (shrink)

Comments on Professor Feigl's very comprehensive review of the problem of existential hypotheses may take one of two forms. One may accept the problem in Feigl's own terms and either sympathize or criticize the realistic empiricism to which he subscribes. Or, one may feel that the entire approach is ill-founded, and hence that the distinctions in viewpoints which he draws are comparable to splits in a political party whose basic tenets are incompatible with one's own. This comment takes the second (...) course, and as a commentary can do little more than point out the more serious of the differences which separate Feigl's views from those of the writer. (shrink)

It is a curious fact that in the many writings on the theory of probability, one rarely finds an instance of a clear cut definition of the fundamental problem of the subject. On intuitive grounds, one grasps the intent of most of the authors: it is to define the concept of probability and to show its relationship to the other concepts of science; and yet since the criterion of adequacy in the answering of this question is rarely stated, one must (...) feel that the problem itself has remained undefined. (shrink)

In order adequately to refute the charge that relativism makes against any absolute answer to problems of science, it will be necessary for us to generalize upon the principal theme and attempt a characterization of experimental methodology. Only by thus determining what constitutes experimental inquiry in general can we hope to define that particular aspect of it which involves the concept of probability.

The reader will be a patient one indeed who has not long since raised in his mind what appear to be pertinent and pressing problems concerning the description of experimental method that has so far been given. These questions are mainly concerned with matters of omission: for example, we have said that if a lack of control is shown, then the image should be changed. But how changed? What principle or method guides the selection of a new image of nature (...) when the old is no longer permissible? Or again, we have said that “observations should be made“. But what is an observation? What principle or method guides the experimenter in deciding which of his activities are observations? (shrink)

The history of Western culture exhibits a profound cleavage of opinion on the nature of what its members take to be reality. On the one hand, there are those for whom certain aspects, at least, of the “real” exist in the human mind only. Others assign as the sole basis of reality the world of non-mental objects. This difference of temperament is so pervasive that it forms a perennial theme, not only for philosophers, but also for scientists, poets, and other (...) students of the vast panorama of the world and its people. (shrink)

Since the turn of the century there has been a strong trend to break through the wall which has separated philosophy from the “special sciences” and to investigate the problems which require a good judgment in both philosophy and science. The evolution of science itself and the increasing relevance of science in human life have given immense momentum to this trend. But this momentum could not be appreciated in its actual strength because scientists who wanted to raise their voices had (...) trouble in finding a Journal where they could communicate with the people who were interested, for almost all the scientific journals were devoted exclusively to technical papers. In founding Philosophy of Science Dr. Malisoff started the construction of a channel by which this important flow of scientific investigation could reach its public. This line of thought found in the journal a possibility of self-expression and it became a real force in the life of the community of scientists and scholars, and even of educated men in general. From the first volume, papers were published which have later been quoted in every discussion about the philosophy of science. I mention, as an example only, R. Carnap's paper on Testability and Meaning. Nobody who has wanted information and stimulation in this modern field of investigation could get it without looking into Malisoff's Philosophy of Science. (shrink)